Epidemiological model of the spread of COVID-19 in Hawaii’s challenging fight against the disease

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The team is growing with a large R_0 number :-) and not everyone is on the picture....
A journey into modeling COVID-19 in Hawai‘i

Part 1:
- Virology
- History of Pandemic in Hawai‘i
  - 1918-1920 Influenza
- COVID-19 in Hawai‘i

Part 2:
- SEIR Compartmentalized Model
- Observable HQ

Part 3:
- Outreach - Community
- Future work
VIROLOGY
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Virology

SARS-CoV-2 (COVID19)
Enveloped virus

Genetically similar to MERS/SARS

COVID19 infects cells similarly to other viruses
Transmission

- 3 Major Modes
- Droplet
- Aerosolized
- Fomite
Droplet
Major terms related to Transmission

- Incubation period
- Presymptomatic
- Asymptomatic
- Symptomatic
- Recovered
- Period of infectivity
Major Terms related to Transmission

Incubation Period
Time from infection to presentation of signs and symptoms
Latent is part of incubation period where not infectious
Major Terms related to Transmission

Presymptomatic=subclinical infectious

Subject is infectious but is not presenting with signs and symptoms

Asymptomatic-Infectious, but no symptoms
Major Terms related to Transmission

Recovered - Medical and testing criteria

Medically - Fever free w/o meds for 3 consecutive days

Test negative twice, at least 24 hours apart
Major Terms related to Transmission

Period of infectiousness
Depends on seriousness of disease
  Asymptomatic
  Symptomatic
    Presymptomatic
    Mild
    Severe

Still don’t have good estimates, too many unknown variables
Testing
Testing

1. A swab is taken from the nose or the back of the throat and sent to a laboratory.

2. RNA of SARS-CoV-19 is purified and converted into DNA.

3. The PCR duplicates the virus DNA; the dyes bind to the copied virus DNA.

Problems

- COVID-19 can move from the upper airways to the lung, samples come from nose or throat => limits amount of pathogen
- Pathogen does not last many hours => time to get sample to lab is critical
- Contamination or degradation can cause issues
- Coping with high demand => enough chemicals, personnel, time
Testing
Antibody Testing
Testing

Sensitivity: Ability to accurately identify true positives

Specificity: Ability to accurately identify true negatives

False Positives
False Negatives
Testing Impacts

Policies based on testing

Antibody versus PCR
Quarantine vs Isolation

Utilizations

State of Hawaii

14 Days

Who knows what is next
Major Risk Factors

- Age
- Population Density
- Comorbidities
- Occupation
- Gender
- Ethnicity
Preventative Measures

- Wear a Mask
- Physical distancing
- Hand washing
- Exercise
- Diet
- Any other way to reduce risk
Local applied epidemiologists, data scientists, health workers, and professionals addressing COVID-19 in Hawaiʻi
Hawaiʻi COVID-19 Forecast

HiPAM is committed to reviewing existing epidemiologic models and the data they require, and to adapting tools to inform decision-making and planning that account for Hawaiʻi’s unique context. For details, click here.

*For a snapshot of the Current Situation in Hawaiʻi, click here.
HISTORY OF PANDEMIC IN HAWAI’I
History of Pandemics in Hawaiʻi

Hawai’i Features

- Early viruses entering Hawai’i decimated the vulnerable, Native Hawaiian population.
  - Despite sailors attempting to prevent spread of disease, complications resulted in over-staying on the island.
- Hawai’i carries a large population of elderly, a more susceptible demographic of most diseases.
- The isolated environment of the archipelago allows for a situational closure of borders.
1918-1920 Influenza Pandemic

- Killed an estimated 21 million people globally
  - 675,000 Americans
  - 2,300 people in Hawai’i

- Swept through Hawai’i in two waves:
  - July 1918 – August 1918
  - December 1918 – January 1919

- Health facilities faced supply shortages, communities shut down, and officials argued closure would have little effect on death rates.
Data on 1918-1920 Influenza Pandemic

- Morbidity for influenza was unavailable before October 21, 1918.
- Influenza morbidity is often under reported when compared to influenza mortality.
- Hawai‘i, a territory and not yet a state, had data omitted from national totals until being added to the death registration area in 1917.
- Morbidity figures tended to omit pneumonia, an often outcome for influenza patients.
Lag and Wave Behavior

Deaths for Hawaii and the US Death Registration Area.

On the right is the deaths from Influenza and pneumonia across the 1918-1920 pandemic.
Death rates were highest for children under 5 and lowest for children between 5 and 19.

Sex death ratios remained the same.

Flu deaths more strongly affected Japanese and pure Hawaiian ethnicities.
COVID-19 in Hawai‘i

Pacific Islanders are disproportionately affected by COVID-19 even though they make up only about 4% of Hawaii’s population.
### By Age, Sex, and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 years</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>60-69 years</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79 years</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80+ years</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>State Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian</td>
<td>&lt;5</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islander</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>&lt;5</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>&lt;5</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>&lt;5</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreported</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data available from the Hawai‘i DOH up until September 18, 2020.*

Further dashboards are available from the DOH and other various public sources.
Hawai’i and the United States (as of Sept. 22)

Hawai’i exhibits the same “waves” behavior that the rest of the nation does.

The death rate in Hawai’i is approximately 1.04%, which is lower than the current national average of approximately 2.92%.
Timeline of COVID-19 Major Events in Hawaii

3/6: First case
3/11: First death
3/25: State and Maui County stay-at-home orders begin. Public gathering spaces closed until Apr 30

5/5: Safer-at-home orders begin
5/15: Honolulu shopping centers, sport fields and courts, and drive-in services for religious purposes reopen
5/18: "Safer at Home" changes to "Acting with Care". Medium-risk businesses can reopen in several weeks
5/31: Stay-at-home orders end
6/2: Daily cases reach double digits first time since Apr 18
6/12: 14-day quarantine for all travelers ends
6/30: 14-day quarantine for all travelers ends
6/19: Gyms, recreation areas, bars, and most other places reopen in Honolulu
6/16: Intersland travelers no longer require self-quarantine
7/23: Starts three record-setting days of case count: 55,60,73
8/1: Out-of-state visitors allowed to avoid 14-day quarantine with negative test results upon arrival
8/18: Emergency Order 2020-24 Act With Care, No Social Gatherings enacted
8/27: New 14-day stay-at-home order begins; DOE extends distance learning until Oct 2
9/15: Death rate hits 100
9/24: Four-week stay-at-home order ends with a new tiered system for reopening

2/7: Surge testing funded: 5000 people tested with 277 new cases
8/13: Daily cases of 355 sets new record; Marking 12+ days of 100+ daily new cases
1918-1920 Influenza versus COVID-19 in Hawai’i

CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/h1n1-summary.htm
Nuances of Comparison

- It may be too early to already compare the 1918-1920 Influenza pandemic to the COVID-19 Pandemic.
- Data for the 1918-1920 Influenza pandemic is limited to deaths, whereas the COVID-19 pandemic provides much more complete data.
Comparisons and Contrasts - Deaths

Comparisons:
- There is a delay of waves between the US and Hawai‘i.
- Dominantly impacts males over females.

Contrasts:
- Minority races at the time of the pandemic were disproportionately affected.
- 1918 Influenza targeted individuals under age 5, while COVID-19 targets individuals older than 60.
In initial stages of the pandemic, the public doubted the risk of the virus, comparing it to another type of annual flu.

Now we will:


Control Influenza, 2018-2020 Season

http://maxwaytec.com/wearing-face-mask-is-neccessary/
Weekly Cases

- Influenza 2019-2020 was really similar to Influenza 2018-2019 leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, but plummeted once the COVID-19 pandemic began.
  - A strong by-product of the stay-at-home order.
- The peak of cases for COVID-19 is more than double the peak of either flu.
  - Confirmation bias via. increased testing.
  - Higher reported infectious period of COVID-19.
Positivity Rate

- Influenza 2018-2019 has an average positivity rate of 17%, Influenza 2019-2020 has an average positivity rate of 13.7%, and COVID-19 has an average positivity rate of 2.2%.
  - Increased testing for COVID-19 likely affected Influenza 2019-2020, giving more negatives.
Weekly Tests

- Before the stay-at-home order, the testing for influenza 2019-2020 significantly rose; however, once the stay-at-home order ended, testing for influenza 2019-2020 dropped.
  - The reason for this disparity is unknown, but we speculate that individuals with flu symptoms likely feared having COVID-19, and did not go to get tested.
Weekly Deaths

- Influenza 2019-2020 did not stray far from Influenza 2018-2019 in this statistic, as they both decreased around the stay-at-home order.
- COVID-19 gives much more deaths than influenza, dismissing the idea of a “less dangerous flu”.

![Influenza vs. COVID-19 Weekly Deaths](chart.png)
How Will COVID-19 and Influenza Behave Together

Although it may be too early to draw definitive conclusions, the data shows similarities and differences between the two viruses.

With the new Influenza 2020-2021 season beginning, we will likely see less attention towards influenza and more towards COVID-19, leading to a tradeoff in damages.
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL MODEL OF THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IN HAWAI’I

Effect of contact tracing (CT) on the number of new daily cases.

- Days 0 to 70: 7 day average of daily new cases
- Days 70 to 105: Effect of mask mandates
- Days 105 to 140: Efforts to ramp up contact tracing
- Days 140 to 170: Contact tracing efforts continue
- Days 170 to 200: K-12 public schools move to stage 2 instruction

Projected number of daily new cases

Days since March 6
Epidemiological model of the spread of COVID-19 in Hawaii’s challenging fight against the disease

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Presentation Content

- Project Overview
- Mathematical Modeling
- Revisiting the Past
- Simulating Forward Scenarios
- Conclusion and Future Work
Primary Goal of Our Work

To capture peculiarity of the situation in Hawai’i and provide detailed modeling of current virus spread patterns aligned with dates of lockdown and similar measures. We use this analysis to formulate scenario outcomes moving forward.

Isolated Geographic Location

Hawai’i and other US Islands have been noted by the media as COVID-19 hotspots in August after a relatively calm period of low case rates. U.S. Surgeon General Jerome Adams came in person on August 25 to Oahu to address the alarming situation.
Isolated: Good or Bad?

Hawai‘i finds itself in a unique position due to its extremely isolated geographic location, mostly linear population distribution along the coast, and a heavy dependence on the tourism and hospitality sectors of the economy.

- While the first two factors appeared advantageous in the fight against the disease, the latter one creates a tempering effect on feasible long-term mitigation efforts, since too stringent an approach may lead to a catastrophic impact on the economy.

- We study the unique aspects of Hawai‘i from both a social and data-driven modeling perspective to understand and recommend the critical intervention measures that make the most impact on spread of the disease while mitigating societal adversities.
Hawai’i crushing COVID-19

The March stay-at-home order brought applause when the epidemic was stomped flat but as a result Hawai’i remained extremely vulnerable to the disease exemplified by the following alarming situation in which the islands saw a very significant second wave of infections.

COVID-19 crushing Hawai’i

The state’s seven day average case rate per 100,000 of populations went from months at the bottom of the US list to holding a clear spot in the top 15 as of the ending days of August 2020

\[^{a}\text{Covid in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count - The New York Times}\]
Epidemiological Models

Compartmentalized SEIR models of the COVID-19 provide the basis for much of the current epidemiological modeling efforts world-wide, however variants in the compartmental choices and corresponding variables allow for parameter matching and optimizations, thus providing useful predictive information specific to our Island population.

What can they do?

Making a good model for a pandemic is difficult, but it is even harder to use it properly. There is no reliable data on how the coronavirus spreads, and people turn out to be really, really complicated!%

- Understand the past
- "What-If" scenarios!
- Who should received vaccine first?

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%Maggie Koerth, Coronavirus Models Were Always About More Than Flattening The Curve
To model the spread of COVID-19, we employ a compartmentalized model\(^a\), which is based on a standard discrete SEIR model. As in the standard SEIR model, we partition a given population into four compartments: **Susceptible** (not currently infected), **Exposed** (infected with no symptoms), **Infected** (infected with symptoms), **Removed** (recovered or deceased).

\(^a\)Curtailing transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome within a community and its hospital, Lloyd-Smith & al.

\[ \beta \] transmission rate

\[ p \] probability to develop symptoms

\[ r \] recovery rate
To better capture the dynamics of the infection, we divide the whole population into two population groups: the general community and healthcare workers (healthcare workers play a vital role and are exposed in different ways than the general community.

In addition, compartments Exposed and Infected (in each population group) are split into multiple stages to better reflect the progression of the disease. The dynamics of each population group have two distinguished parts: the dynamics of Susceptible individuals, and the dynamics of the rest of the compartments. The former is governed by the hazard rate.
Variables

**Variable** $S(t)$. The number of susceptible individuals.

**Variables** $E_i(t)$. The number of asymptomatic infected individuals $i$ days after exposure who are not quarantined.

**Variables** $E_{q,i}(t)$. The number of quarantined asymptomatic infected individuals $i$ days after exposure.

**Variables** $I_{j}(t), i = 0, 1$. The number of symptomatic infected individuals $i$ days after the onset of symptoms who are not quarantined.

**Variables** $I_{j}(t), j = 3, 4, 5$. The number of symptomatic infected individuals at the nominal stage $i$ of the illness. Note that a person can stay at a given stage for several days.

**Variables** $I_{q,j}(t), j = 0, 1$. The number of quarantined symptomatic infected individuals, with $j$ representing either the number of days after the onset of the symptoms ($j = 0, 1$), or the stage of the illness ($j = 2, 3, 4$).

**Variable** $R(t)$. The number of removed (recovered or deceased) individuals.
GSEIR Diagram
Dynamics Equations

The equations for the dynamics of the two population groups are essentially the same. Only the hazard rate and the parameters determining transition rates into quarantine may be different between the two groups.

\[
S(t + 1) = e^{-\lambda(t)} S(t)
\]
\[
E_0(t + 1) = (1 - e^{-\lambda(t)}) S(t)
\]
\[
E_i(t + 1) = (1 - p_{i-1})(1 - q_{a,i-1}) E_{i-1}(t), \quad i = 1, \ldots, 13
\]
\[
E_{q,i}(t + 1) = (1 - p_{i-1})(q_{a,i-1} E_{i-1}(t) + E_{q,i-1}(t)), \quad i = 1, \ldots, 13
\]
\[
l_0(t + 1) = \sum_{i=0}^{13} p_i (1 - q_{a,i}) E_i(t)
\]
\[
l_1(t + 1) = (1 - q_{s,0}) l_0(t)
\]
\[
l_2(t + 1) = (1 - q_{s,1}) l_1(t) + (1 - r)(1 - q_{s,2}) l_2(t)
\]
\[ l_j(t + 1) = r(1 - q_{s,j-1})l_{j-1}(t) + \\
+ (1 - r)(1 - q_{s,j})l_j(t), \quad j = 3, 4 \]

\[ l_{q,0}(t + 1) = \sum_{i=0}^{13} p_i(q_{a,i}E_i(t) + E_{q,i}(t)) \]

\[ l_{q,1}(t + 1) = l_{q,0}(t) + q_{s,0}l_0(t) \]

\[ l_{q,2}(t + 1) = l_{q,1}(t) + q_{s,1}l_1(t) + \\
+ (1 - r)(q_{s,2}l_2(t) + l_{q,2}(t)) \]

\[ l_{q,j}(t + 1) = r(q_{s,j-1}l_{j-1}(t) + l_{q,j-1}(t)) + \\
+ (1 - r)(q_{s,j}l_j(t) + l_{q,j}(t)), \quad j = 3, 4 \]

\[ R(t + 1) = R(t) + rl_4(t) + rl_{q,4}(t) + \\
+ (1 - p_{13})E_{13}(t) + (1 - p_{13})E_{q,13}(t) \]
Hazard Rate and Mixing Pool

The hazard rate, $\lambda(t)$, depends on time and essentially determines the probability, $1 - e^{-\lambda(t)}$, of an individual becoming exposed at time $t$. It is different for different population groups and takes into account interactions between the groups, thus coupling their dynamics.

**Hazard Rate Community**

$$\lambda_c(t) = \beta \left[ (1 - \nu)I_{c,q} + \nu E_{c,q} \right] + \gamma \left[ (1 - \nu)I_{c} + \nu E_{c} \right] + \rho \left[ (1 - \nu)I_{h} + \nu E_{h} \right] / N_c,$$

with

$$N_c(t) = S_c + E_c + I_c + R_c + \rho(S_h + E_h + I_h + R_h).$$

**Hazard Rate Health Care Workers**

$$\lambda_h(t) = \rho \lambda_c + \beta \eta \left[ (1 - \nu)I_{h} + \nu E_{h} \right] + \kappa \nu \left[ I_{h,q} + I_{c,q} \right] / N_h,$$

with

$$N_h(t) = S_h + E_h + I_h + R_h.$$
Oahu Island

**Island specific regulations**

We focus specifically on Oahu, the most-affected by COVID-19 Island as of now, since each island (or group of islands in the case of Maui) has its own mayor and thus restrictions and governmental actions may vary slightly within the entire state as they are determined not only uniformly by the Governor but also by the Mayors and local governments of the outer islands.

**Oahu**

Oahu is the most populated island in the chain, providing an appropriate data set for interpretation of our models as well as guidance for the entire state.
### Variable and Parameters for Oahu Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter, meaning</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$, basal transmission rates</td>
<td>optimized to fit data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors modifying transmission rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon$, asymptomatic transmission</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$, reduced healthcare worker interactions</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$, quarantine</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$, hospital precautions</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$, healthcare worker precautions</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu$, symptomatic hospitalization</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Variable and Parameters for Oahu Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p_i$, $i = 0, \ldots, 13$</td>
<td>Onset of symptoms after day $i$</td>
<td>0.000792, 0.00198, 0.1056, 0.198, 0.2376, 0.0858, 0.0528, 0.0462, 0.0396, 0.0264, 0.0198, 0.0198, 0.0198, 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_{a,i}$, $i = 0, \ldots, 13$</td>
<td>Asymptomatic quarantine after day $i$</td>
<td>0 before June 10, then $q_5 = q_6 = q_7 = 0.05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_{s,i}$, $i = 0, \ldots, 4$</td>
<td>Symptomatic quarantine after day/stage $i$</td>
<td>C: 0.1, 0.4, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99; H: 0.2, 0.5, 0.9, 0.98, 0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>Transition to next symptomatic day/stage</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Choice of Parameters

The model depends on a large quantities of parameters. The $p_i$ (probability for the onset of symptoms to appear after day $i$) and $r$ the probability for the illness to evolve and eventually recover are chosen to reflect some CDC estimations.

### Asymptomatic

It is based to reflect the assumption that 40% of all infections remain asymptomatic:

$$0.4 = \sum_{i=0}^{13} \frac{(i + 1)p_i \prod_{j=0}^{i-1} (1 - p_j)}{1 - \prod_{i=0}^{13} (1 - p_i)}.$$

### Length of Illness

It is based on the assumption that the average length of illness is 17 days:

$$17 = 2 + \sum_{n=3}^{\infty} \frac{n(n - 1)(n - 2)}{2} r^3 (1 - r)^{n-3} = 2 + \frac{3}{r}.$$
Initial Conditions

The initial values of most variables are zero. The only non-zero values are the number of susceptible individuals in the general community and the healthcare worker community, $S_c(0) = 937711$, $S_h(0) = 15000$.

First COVID-19 case, March 6, 2020

In addition, we assume a single not quarantined symptomatic individual, reflecting the first detected case of COVID-19 on Oahu: $I_{c,0}(0) = 1$. 
Except for the basal transmission rate $\beta$ of SARS-CoV-2, our model parameters are fixed to correspond to available information about the virus and the disease.

The primary task is to determine model’s parameters necessary for an accurate data fit of Oahu data from March 6th to August 27. We use data from the Hawaii Data Collaborative for the count of daily cases as well as active hospitalisations and active ICU beds $^a$.

$^a$https://www.hawaiidata.org/covid19

The basal rate of transmission is adjusted in time to reflect non-pharmaceutical measures taken by state of Hawaiʻi during this pandemic.

**Basal Transmission Rates**

They are obtained by optimizing the fit to the data using the Levenberg–Marquardt algorithm.
Here are the optimized transmission rates to fit Oahu data. They reflect the State and Oahu non-pharmaceutical mitigation measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>March 6 - April 2</th>
<th>April 2 - May 20</th>
<th>May 20 - May 30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.3657</td>
<td>0.0491</td>
<td>0.1133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30 - June 10</td>
<td>0.2109</td>
<td>0.1694</td>
<td>0.1086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10 - Aug 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 11 - Aug 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure: Daily cases. Dots are the actual data and the plain line represents the model. We also delineate the various mitigation measures that took place during that period.
An important quantifier in COVID-19 is the number of hospitalization and ICU beds. Since we have seen hospitals throughout the world being overwhelmed by the number of COVID-19 patients, it is a critical element of mitigation strategy. The data are shown starting July 18, since the numbers for earlier dates have not been released by the Department of Health.

Figure: Data fit for data on active hospitalization (blue) and ICU beds (green). Real data are dots (State) and model predictions are lines (Oahu).
Revisiting the Past

We first retrospectively predict the impact on the number of hospitalisations and ICU beds if proper testing/contact tracing and quarantine measures would have been in place on June 10, corresponding to the date when many of the Hawai’i stay-at-home restrictions were lifted.
Contact Tracing Assumption

In our data fit, we assumed that starting June 10, 15% of the asymptomatic people are going into quarantine as the result of testing and contact tracing. More precisely, we assume we catch about 14.3% of asymptomatic population as follows: 5% after day 5 of being exposed, then 5% of the remaining after day 6 of exposure, and then another 5% of the remaining after day 7.

We will denote this scenario as $5 : 0.05, 6 : 0.05, 7 : 0.05$ (days 5, 6 and 7, each at 5%).

Impact Factors

There are several factors which affect the number of asymptomatic individuals going into quarantine, thus slowing down the spread of the virus: improved testing with more rapid turn around, increased contact tracing, and dedicated quarantine facilities.
Impact of early asymptomatic quarantine

Table below shows the impact of the earlier detection on the total number of cases from June 10 to August 27 as well as on the cumulative number of active hospitalisations and active ICU patients for the two and a half month period. These cumulative numbers are computed by summing up the number of all hospitalized (ICU) patients for each day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Testing/Contact Tracing</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>Cum act Hospt.</th>
<th>Cum act ICU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5:0.05, 6:0.05, 7:0.05</td>
<td>6517</td>
<td>4721</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:0.05, 4:0.05, 5:0.05</td>
<td>5658</td>
<td>4163</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:0.05, 3:0.05, 4:0.05</td>
<td>5102</td>
<td>3799</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:0.1, 6:0.1, 7:0.1</td>
<td>5760</td>
<td>3953</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:0.1, 4:0.1, 5:0.1</td>
<td>4346</td>
<td>3088</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:0.1, 3:0.1, 4:0.1</td>
<td>3551</td>
<td>2590</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Impact of the volume of asymptomatic quarantine

The actual percentage of detected asymptomatic individuals is affected by the amount of testing done, by the amount of contact tracing resources available, and in large part, by quarantine facilities. Quarantine facilities are particularly important for the Oahu modeling, since a large number of residents live in multi-generational and non-family member shared households. Note that the quarantine fraction of 0.1 on each of the three days leads to the overall 27% detection of asymptomatic cases, 0.2 reaches 48.8%, and 0.3 reaches 65%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Testing/Contact Tracing</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>Cum act Hospt.</th>
<th>Cum act ICU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5:0.05, 6:0.05, 7:0.05</td>
<td>6517</td>
<td>4721</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:0.1, 6:0.1, 7:0.1</td>
<td>5760</td>
<td>3953</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:0.2, 6:0.2, 7:0.2</td>
<td>4499</td>
<td>2865</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:0.3, 6:0.3, 7:0.3</td>
<td>3573</td>
<td>2175</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alternate scenarios

Our model suggests a larger benefit when asymptomatic individuals are caught early. Combining both of the above factors, we create various scenarios to predict how the total hospitalisation and ICU beds would have been affected.

![Diagram showing comparison of daily cases real data fit to alternate scenarios]
Hospitalisation and ICU variations for different scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Testing/Contact Tracing</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>Cum act Hospt.</th>
<th>Cum act ICU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5:0.05, 6:0.05, 7:0.05</td>
<td>6517</td>
<td>4721</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:0.15, 4:0.2, 5:0.1</td>
<td>3249</td>
<td>2269</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:0.15, 3:0.3, 4:0.2</td>
<td>1667</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Updated hospital capacity as of March 30, 2020:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of OHCA licensed beds</td>
<td>2,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ICU beds</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ventilators</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beds excluding ICU beds</td>
<td>2,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beds occupied-32%</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ICU beds occupied-37%</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of ventilators in use-11%</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Healthcare Association of Hawaii
Discussion

Data Fitting

A zoom on the data fit for dates between March 6 and May 30 demonstrates the efficiency and good timing of the first stay-at-home order, Hawai’i even being referred at the time as the safest state. Starting in mid-June we see the daily cases increasing and following an exponential trend for a 40 day period to become one of the worst states in dealing with the pandemic.

Contact Tracing/Testing and Quarantine

We show that with an increased structure of testing/contact tracing and quarantine facilities, we could have dramatically impacted the outcome as of August 27. Our results show that earlier detection of asymptomatic individuals has the most effect on the behavior of the model. Assuming we traced and quarantine successfully 52% of the asymptomatic population after days 2, 3 and 4 (more dominantly after day 3 of being exposed), we would have seen a reduction of 4850 total daily cases, 3513 cumulative active hospitalisation and 702 cumulative active ICU beds which is equivalent to a reduction of about 74% for total daily case, and for both hospitalisation and ICU beds.
Oahu Improved Contact Tracing

COVID-19 Contact Tracing Numbers
Reported for the week of October 5 - October 11

Investigation Team
308

Contact Tracers Working On Neighbor Islands:
102

Contact Tracers Working On Oahu:
206

This report only reflects Contact Tracers who are scheduled to work at least 24 hours during the reported period and does not include any additional staff that may be available and possibly included in other reports regarding Contact Tracers.
Forecasting Scenarios

The data fitting and parameter matching specific to our Oahu data allows us to better understand the effects of the various parameters as well as the transmission rate fits. We then use this to provide scenarios past August 27, 2020 that are dependant on testing/contact tracing and quarantine measures.

The transmission rate is adjusted for each scenario depending on various societal events: stay-at-home order (we assume $\beta$ slightly higher than during the first stay-at-home order due to community spread); Labor day holiday weekend (increase in transmission rate for a few days); lifting the stay-at-home order on October 5 (varies depending on population behavior), Thanksgiving holiday.
Scenario 1

**Assumptions**

Very aggressive testing/contact tracing and facility quarantine but moderate compliance in individual behavior. Assumes catching a total of 78% of asymptomatic individuals between days 2 and 4 of exposure. We assume the population will behave similarly to what happened after June 10 once the stay-at-home order is lifted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transmission rates for Scenario 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 30 - Sep 11 ( \beta = 0.09 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 5 - Dec 1 ( \beta = 0.17 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Testing/Tracing for Scenario 1: 2:0.4, 3:0.4, 4:0.4
Scenarios 2 and 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transmission rates for Scenario 2 and 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 30 - Sep 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta = 0.09$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 11 - Sep 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta = 0.12$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 14 - Oct 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta = 0.09$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 5 - Dec 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta = 0.145$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1 - Dec 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta = 0.2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 5 - Dec 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta = 0.145$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testing/Tracing for Scenario 2: 0.2, 3:0.2, 4:0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testing/Tracing for Scenario 3: 3:0.2, 4:0.2, 5:0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assumptions

More realistic testing/contact tracing and facility quarantine but higher compliance in individual behavior starting after lifting the stay-at-home order on October 5. Assumes catching a total of 49% of asymptomatic individuals between days 2 and 4 of exposure. We assume the population will behave in a more compliant way than what happened after June 10 once the stay-at-home order is lifted. The transmission rate is thus reduced from 0.1694 to 0.145. Scenario 3 is identical to scenario 2 but with more a relaxed testing/contact tracing and facility quarantine.
Simulating Scenarios 1, 2 and 3: Daily Cases

Figure: Scenario 1: plain line. Scenario 2: dot-dash line. Scenario 3: dash line. Scenario 1 is better at first but scenario 2 is provides the best outcome over the long run.
Simulating Scenarios 1, 2 and 3: Daily Cases

Peak for Each Scenario

It is important to note that the wave for scenario 2 starts to decrease in early 2021, while the number of daily cases for scenarios 1 and 3 keeps increasing, with a peak of 594 daily cases on April 3 for scenario 1, and a peak of 541 daily cases on April 23 for scenario 3.

1. For scenario 2, the maximum daily cases will not exceed 193 and the peak will occur in early December due to an assumed increase in non-compliance during the Thanksgiving holiday.

2. For scenario 3 we are looking at 541 cases in early April.

3. We reach 594 cases in late April for scenario 1.
Discussion

We demonstrate how different transmission rates and testing/contact tracing, quarantine facilities affect the future of the curve. The takeaway from these results is that to succeed in controlling the curve, we need a combination of aggressive testing/contact tracing, quarantine facilities as well as compliance from individual to keep the transmission rate to lower levels.

Contact Tracing/Testing and Quarantine

Scenario 1 assumes almost perfect success in quarantining exposed individuals but transmission rates comparable to what we had after the State lifted the first stay-at-home order. Scenario 2 assumes better compliance from the population (lower transmission rate $\beta$) and aggressive but doable contact tracing; it provides the best outcome. Scenario 3 with same transmission rate as scenario 2 but shifting the contact tracing by one day shows significantly more cases.

The conclusion is that to control the curve long term we need both: aggressive contact tracing and high compliance from the population.
Conclusion

If provided contact tracing was in place with quarantine facilities as well as explicit guidance for the public on how to behave and compliance to those, we would be now under 50 daily cases and a second stay-at-home would not have been necessary.

Economic Impact

The best alternate scenario reduces the total hospitalisation and ICU beds by 74% which amount to almost $10 million. Contact tracing, as well as quarantine facilities also have a cost, but it will be quite lower. Comparing the forecasting scenario, we obtain that as of December 31, scenario 2 saves more than $12 million compared to scenario 3 and scenario 1 saves almost $4 million compared to scenario 3. Those amounts increase quite dramatically after December 31, 2020.
Future work

- The State of Hawai‘i is, since March 26, 2020, in an effective isolation bubble following the mandatory 14-day traveler quarantine that has not yet been lifted. The interisland quarantine was lifted on June 16 and then partially reinstated on August 11. This is the reason why travelers are not explicitly included in our work; they are currently virtually nonexistent (counts dropped to the lower hundreds from a historical norm of about 30,000 a day). Traveling is reopening again, we are working to add tourists and traveler residents in the model.

- Current work is introducing a new variable category of individual that reflect vaccination. Indeed, our compartmental model can be used to account for the additional sub-population of the vaccinated.

- Understanding how the flu is going to interact with COVID-19 is another big unknown.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Confirmed Cases by ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA)* (N=537)

Kauai County

Honolulu County

Maui County

Hawaii County

COVID-19 Cases

0 1–5 6–10 11–20 21–50

* Data as of April 18, 2020. Data are preliminary and subject to change. Includes all cases for which location data are available. Case location based on ZCTA of case residence or location stayed while in Hawaii.
†Does not imply that risk of transmission is isolated to these ZCTAs.
OBSERVABLE HQ
Reproducible model simulations with Observable
Goals

1. Painless model alterations
2. Possibility to simulate multiple models
3. Accessibility for every member of the team
4. Customized visualization
5. Reproducibility
6. Host results on a custom website (future)
Observable: web-based interactive computational/visualization tool

Considering the heterogeneity of our team members’ expertise, we opted to use a web-based interactive computational/visualization tool.

Such tools provide a simple way to share our code along with various visualizations of the results of model simulations.

Considering our first and last goals, we settled on using Observable: https://observablehq.com

Observable’s execution model does automatic propagation of code changes to all the dependencies. Also, since it uses (almost) pure Javascript, transferring the code and results to any website is straightforward.
A quick look at our Observable workspace

Each cell contains Javascript code and returns a single value, shown above the cell.

If the return value of a cell changes, all cells that depend on it are automatically recomputed.

A return value can be any Javascript object, including an SVG image.

One can employ any of the numerous Javascript libraries for visualization and computation.
Show Aloha, WEAR A MASK.
The 5 W's of wearing a face covering to prevent the spread of COVID-19

**WHO should wear a mask?**
Everyone, except those under 2 years of age, or with medical conditions that prevent you from wearing one.

**WHAT type of mask should one wear?**
A cloth or non-medical surgical mask is ideal in order to prevent any shortages of personal protective equipment for healthcare workers.

**WHEN should one wear a mask?**
Anytime you may interact with people outside of your household, such as using public transport, buying groceries, or eating out.

**WHERE should one's mask cover?**
The mask should fit snugly and fully cover your nose and mouth in order to be effective!

**WHY are masks necessary?**
To protect each other, especially our kūpuna! A mask can help trap and block droplets from an infected person.

Visit hphi.org/covid19 for state and county information on COVID-19 safety.
THANK YOU