**Towards a Secured City:** The Contribution of the Smart City Physical Demonstrator in Threat

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- Master's degree in Biomedical engineering by UPV (Valencia, Spain)
- CSIRT-CV, Industrial Cybersecurity (Valencia, Spain)







## Current work in CSIRT-CV

## What is CSIRT-CV?

ICT Security Centre of the Comunitat Valenciana, dependent on Generalitat Valenciana.

CSIRT-CV offers services within the Comunitat Valenciana (Alicante, Castellón and Valencia), with a non-profit public service vocation, so its services are offered free of charge.

## **Excellence Center of Industrial Cybersecurity**

- Industrial Laboratory
  - Honeynet
  - Medical Image Unit

de la Comunitat Valenciana

SmartCity

GENERALITAT

VALENCIANA Conselleria d'Hisenda, Economia

i Administració Pública







## **Smart Cities**

- Reducing consumption of resources
- Improving efficiency of management of services
- Improving quality of life
- Reducing pollution
- Safer cities and more livable

#### • Internet of Things (IoT)

- Precise and instantaneous measurement
- Make decisions based on highly accurate

data

- Rapid transition to smart cities
- Rapid adoption without regard to the cybersecurity

Cyberattack on Kansas town affects email, phone, payment systems









- Need of understanding of the implicit risks
- Prepare to respond
- Securitization specialized

## **Smart Cities**



#### **Objectives**

- Hybrid testbed: real systems & simulated
- Represent a Smart City
  - conducting cybersecurity tests
  - observe the impacts of cyberattacks
  - raising awareness
  - investigate and analyze in depth the systems and threats
  - generate measures to reduce impact









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## Ransomware attack on the charging

#### infrastructure

- Power down the charger's sockets.
- Disable the charger and ask for a ransom

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 It will be shown that an attempt is made to enable the charger, but it automatically reverts to the disabled state.

#### MitM in the charging system

- Show the customer that his vehicle is charging when it is not.
- Blue light indicating "charging" status will illuminate but the charging socket will actually be powered down.





### Obtaining credentials from the waste management sensor Method of extracting authentication credentials through tools against

the MQTT protocol.

#### MitM between the waste management sensor and the

#### management platform

**Tampering** in the middle of the communications between the sensor and the sensor management web page to steal information or enter modified information.







#### **Obtaining camera credentials**

Obtain the **camera's credentials** via Web cookie or via brute force by performing an attack on its sending protocol (RTSP).

#### Attack on the camera access token

By means of the user's access token, different **configuration elements** such as zoom, brightness or intensity can be changed so that the image displayed does not correspond to the real image.













IARIA



#### Ransomware attack & MitM on the charging

#### infrastructure

- Removing the availability of charging devices
- Create significant logistical problem in the city
- Undermining the mobility capacity
- Complaints from the population
- Saturate certain citizen services
- Technical staff will not be able to cover the repair of lots of devices











## Obtaining credentials & MitM from the waste

#### management sensor and management platform

- Trash container is full or not
- Forcing a vehicle to travel to the site, when it is not necessary
- Wasting resources
- Pollution
- Trash container could be full, and no vehicle could appear
- Neighbors' discomfort
- Proliferation of pests









#### Obtaining camera credentials & attack on camera access

#### token

- Having access to modify the credentials
- Restrict workers' access to them
- Power down the cameras
- Force technicians to go in person camera by camera to reset them
- Altering camera visual settings
- Workers or the camera cannot analyze the data correctly
- Al algorithms would include errors







- The Smart City physical demonstrator represents a valuable tool for cybersecurity teams.
- Improve **knowledge** of these Smart City environments.
- Test in a **real simulated environment** and conduct research.
- Attack teams can identify vulnerabilities and exploit them without the risk of causing damage to either facilities or users, gaining hands-on experience in a controlled environment.
- **Defense teams** can monitor the actions carried out by attack teams, learning about existing vulnerabilities in the system and improve their protection strategies.
- The detected abuse cases can be used in **conferences**, **lectures and trainings** to raise community awareness about the importance of cybersecurity in Smart Cities.
- Smart City systems are characterized by their large-scale complexity, making it impractical to acquire numerous physical devices for conducting real-scale testbeds → need of virtualization.
- Absolute fidelity to real-world configurations can prove **challenging**, given that each organization may have specific and **unique configurations**.





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- Incorporation of **luminaires**.
- Examination of **emerging attack vectors** and the development of use cases for training and awareness in the field of cybersecurity.
- Integration of a **3D model** representing a Smart City.
- Comprehensive evaluation of attack pathways and their real-world impact on an urban setting.
- Introduction of new technologies, particularly those involving artificial intelligence (AI), anomaly detection and countering attacks.
- This may also involve deploying **Al-driven monitoring systems**.



# Thank you! Questions?

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