

# Generation of Distributed Denial of Service Network Data with Python and Scapy

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- We aimed to create DDoS attack data suitable for machine learning (labeled datasets)
- DDoS Attacks are among the most common network attacks  
They are difficult to detect and defend
- There are not very many suitable DDoS data sets, so we generate our own data
- We implemented a Python program with the library Scapy to perform DoS Attacks on an Internet-of-Things (IoT) Test setup with simulated distribution by multithreading
- Advantages of this approach: Create DDoS data individually tailored to our needs


### Most common DDoS Attacks in 2022:

- TCP: e.g. Synflood
- UDP Flooding

### Q1 2023:

- 22% of the attacks were Synflood attacks [1]
- 21% were Udpflooding attacks [1]

[1] <https://blog.cloudflare.com/ddos-threat-report-2023-q1>



<http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/02/21/2022-in-review-ddos-attack-trends-and-insights/>


- Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to make a service, reachable over the Internet inaccessible
- They aim to overload a network protocol (e.g. TCP) or exhaust the victims hardware resources (CPU cycles, bandwidth, memory)
- DDoS attacks use DoS techniques with the help of many hosts
- DDoS attacks are financially or politically motivated
- DDoS attacks cause major economic damage

## UDP

- UDP: minimal protocol for connectionless data transfer, with no guarantee of completeness and correctness
- Applications create an UDP header and transfer their data over the Internet Protocol (IP)

## UDP-Flooding

Send large number of UDP packets to exhaust victims resources





## TCP:

- reliable, connection-oriented protocol for data transmission, error checking, flow control, retransmission
- 3-way-handshake: Establish connection between client and server

## Synflooding:

- Exhaust victims backlog with SYN packets to disrupt its ability to establish legitimate connections






## IoT Devices:


- Nedis Cam Grau
- Tapo Cam C 100
- Antela Speed Cam
- Nedis Cam klein
- Amazon Echo dot
- Amazon Echo 2
- Tapo Wifi Socket
- Brennenstuhl Smoke Detector

# Testsetup: Network Diagram





# Implemented Python program



# SYN Packet

```

▶ Frame 32904: 124 bytes on wire (992 bits), 124 bytes captured (992 bits)
▶ Ethernet II, Src: 32:41:82:86:98:9e (32:41:82:86:98:9e), Dst: AmazonTe_52:62:eb (00:71:47:52:62:eb)
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 99.69.179.169, Dst: 192.168.1.4
▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 23629, Dst Port: 0, Seq: 0, Len: 70
  Source Port: 23629
  Destination Port: 0
  [Stream index: 112]
  [Conversation completeness: Incomplete (9)]
  [TCP Segment Len: 70]
  Sequence Number: 0 (relative sequence number)
  Sequence Number (raw): 0
  [Next Sequence Number: 71 (relative sequence number)]
  Acknowledgment Number: 0
  Acknowledgment number (raw): 0
  0101 ... = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)
▶ Flags: 0x002 (SYN)
  Window: 0
  [Calculated window size: 0]
  Checksum: 0x8ace [unverified]
  [Checksum Status: Unverified]
  Urgent Pointer: 0
▶ [Timestamps]
▶ [SEQ/ACK analysis]
  TCP payload (70 bytes)
  Retransmitted TCP segment data (70 bytes)

```


```

0000 00 71 47 52 62 eb 32 41 82 86 98 9e 08 00 45 00  ·qGRb·2A ·····E·
0010 00 6e 00 01 00 00 40 06 a1 ee 63 45 b3 a9 c0 a8  ·n····@· ··cE····
0020 01 04 5c 4d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 02  ··\M· ······P·
0030 00 00 8a ce 00 00 53 59 4e 46 4c 4f 4f 44 58 58  ·····SY NFL00DXX
0040 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0050 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0060 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58  XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0070 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58  XXXXXXXX XXXX

```

# SYN flooding packets / second

Wireshark I/O Graphs: tcpdump\_ap\_iot\_17042023\_02-Angriff-DDoS-SynFlood.pcap



# UDP packet

```

▶ Frame 963299: 1015 bytes on wire (8120 bits), 1015 bytes captured (8120 bits) on interface enp1s0, id 0
▶ Ethernet II, Src: 28:85:bf:2c:80:92 (28:85:bf:2c:80:92), Dst: Shenzhen_0b:ab:be (20:32:33:0b:ab:be)
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 4.164.215.248, Dst: 192.168.1.14
▼ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 61686, Dst Port: 41113
  Source Port: 61686
  Destination Port: 41113
  Length: 981
  Checksum: 0xd8eb [unverified]
  [Checksum Status: Unverified]
  [Stream index: 1141]
  ▶ [Timestamps]
    UDP payload (973 bytes)
▼ Data (973 bytes)
  Data: 554450464c4f4f445858585858585858585858585858585858585858585858585858585858585858585858...
  [Length: 973]

```

0000	20 32 33 0b ab be 28 85 bf 2c 80 92 08 00 45 00	23... ( . , . . . . E .
0010	03 e9 00 01 00 00 40 11 d8 b0 04 a4 d7 f8 c0 a8	. . . . . @ . . . . .
0020	01 0e f0 f6 a0 99 03 d5 d8 eb 55 44 50 46 4c 4f	. . . . . UDPFLO
0030	4f 44 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	0DXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0040	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0050	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0060	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0070	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0080	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
0090	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
00a0	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
00b0	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
00c0	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
00d0	58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58	XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX

# UDP Flooding packets / second

Wireshark I/O Graphs: tcpdump\_ap\_iot\_24042023\_01-Angriff-DDoS-UDPFlood.pcap




TABLE I  
DDoS ATTACK EFFECTS ON IoT DEVICES

DDoS effects on IoT Devices		
IoT device	Attack type	Effect
Amazon Echo	synflood	success
Amazon Echo	udpflood	no success
Nedis Cam Gray	synflood	success
Nedis Cam Gray	udpflood	success
Tapo Cam C100	synflood	success
Tapo Cam C100	udpflood	success
Antela Speed Cam	synflood	success
Antela Speed Cam	udpflood	no success
Nedis cam white	synflood	success
Nedis cam white	udpflood	no success
SV3C camera	synflood	success
SV3C camera	udpflood	no success

- Synflooding was always successful
- Udpflooding not always: some devices ignore incoming udp traffic

- Conduct UDP/SYN-Flooding attacks on IoT Devices
- Capture the traffic with tcpdump (pcap)
- Data processing: Convert packets of pcaps to dicts, check for an intrusion flag in the payload, then expand dicts and label them:  
(intrusion = 1, attack\_type = „udp“ or attack\_type = „syn“)
- Insert the labeled datasets into a sql database for further use

### Advantages

- Create data suitable for machine learning according to users needs
- Program is expandable by other protocols (e.g. ICMP flooding)
- Our method ensures there are no malformed packets
- Cost efficient method

### Limitations

- Simulated distribution is limited by the number of threads on attack host
- Data transfer rate is also lower than in a resource strong DDoS attack

=> **Augmentation** of packet timestamps to create larger, simultaneous attacks



- Validation of training data: Re-create available DDoS datasets
- Test our data with an available IDS
- Expand the program by further attack types
- Conduct a larger field test: Use multiple attack hosts (e.g. raspberry pis) in combination with multithreading to create larger attacks