



Zurich Research Laboratory

Reliability Assessment of Erasure-Coded Storage Systems with Latent Errors

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Short Résumé

- Position
 - IBM Research - Zurich Laboratory since 1988

- Research interests
 - performance evaluation
 - optimization and control of computer communication networks
 - reliability of storage systems
 - storage provisioning for Big Data
 - cloud infrastructures
 - switch architectures
 - stochastic systems


- Affiliations
 - IARIA Fellow
 - senior member of IEEE
 - IFIP Working Group 6.3

- Education
 - Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from Columbia University, New York
 - M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Columbia University, New York
 - B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the National Technical University of Athens, Greece

Data Losses in Storage Systems

- Storage systems suffer from data losses due to
 - component failures
 - disk failures
 - node failures
 - media failures
 - unrecoverable and latent media errors


- Reliability enhanced by a large variety of redundancy and recovery schemes
 - RAID systems (**R**edundant **A**rray of **I**ndependent **D**isks)



- RAID-5: Tolerates one disk failure [\[Patterson et al. 1988\]](#)

Data Losses in Storage Systems


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- Reliability enhanced by a large variety of redundancy and recovery schemes
 - RAID systems



- RAID-5: Tolerates one disk failure
- RAID-6: Tolerates two disk failures

Erasure Coded Schemes

- User data divided into blocks (symbols) of fixed size
 - Complemented with parity symbols
 - codewords



- (m, l) maximum distance separable (MDS) erasure codes
- Any subset of l symbols can be used to reconstruct the codeword

– Replication : $l = 1$ and $m = r$

D_1



$D_1 \dots D_r$

– RAID-5 : $m = l + 1$

$D_1 \ D_2 \ \dots \ D_l$



$D_1 \ D_2 \ \dots \ D_l \ P_{l+1}$

– RAID-6 : $m = l + 2$

$D_1 \ D_2 \ \dots \ D_l$



$D_1 \ D_2 \ \dots \ D_l \ P_{l+1} \ P_{l+2}$


- Storage efficiency : $S_{\text{eff}} = l/m$ (Code rate)

- Google : Three-way replication (3,1) → $S_{\text{eff}} = 33\%$ to Reed-Solomon (9,6) → $S_{\text{eff}} = 66\%$
- Facebook : Three-way replication (3,1) → $S_{\text{eff}} = 33\%$ to Reed-Solomon (14,10) → $S_{\text{eff}} = 71\%$
- Microsoft Azure : Three-way replication (3,1) → $S_{\text{eff}} = 33\%$ to LRC (16,12) → $S_{\text{eff}} = 75\%$

Media errors

- “bit rot” problem: the magnetism of a single bit or a few bits is flipped
 - This type of problem can often (but not always) be detected and corrected with low-level ECC embedded in the drive
- physical damage can occur on the media
 - head crash
 - media scratch
- Disk drives exhibit **unrecoverable sector errors** (*latent sector faults*)
 - a block or set of blocks are inaccessible
 - sectors are *corrupted silently* without the disk being able to detect it
 - a sector error is detected when the sector is accessed for storing or retrieving information
- Factors contributing to unrecoverable sector errors
 - increased areal density of disk drives
 - errors such as bit spillovers on adjacent tracks can corrupt more bits
 - increased use of cheap low-end desktop drives (Integrated Drive Electronics/Advanced Technology Attachment drives)
 - low cost, less tested, less machinery to handle disk errors
 - increased amount of software used on the storage stack
 - firmware on a desktop drive contains about 400 thousand lines of code
 - bugs are inevitable

Unrecoverable Errors and Data Loss




OBJECTIVE

To assess the extent of data loss due to disk failures and unrecoverable errors

RESULTS


- Theoretical assessment of the effect of latent errors on reliability
- Evaluation of MTTDL and EAFDL
 - Analytical approach that does not involve Markovian analysis
 - EAFDL and MTTDL tend to be insensitive to the failure time distributions
 - Real-world distributions, such as Weibull and gamma

Reliability Metrics – MTTDL and EAFDL



- Data loss events documented in practice by Yahoo!, LinkedIn, Facebook and Amazon
 - Amazon S3 (Simple Storage Service) is designed to provide 99.999999999% durability of objects over a given year
 - average annual expected loss of a fraction of 10^{-11} of the data stored in the system
 - Assess the implications of system design choices on the
 - frequency of data loss events
 - **Mean Time to Data Loss (MTTDL)**
 - amount of data lost
 - **Expected Annual Fraction of Data Loss (EAFDL)**
- I. Iliadis and V. Venkatesan,
 “Expected Annual Fraction of Data Loss as a Metric for Data Storage Reliability”, MASCOTS 2014
- These two metrics provide a useful profile of the magnitude and frequency of data losses

Non-Markov Analysis for MTTDL and EAFDL



- EAFDL evaluated in parallel with MTTDL
 - \tilde{r} : Minimum number of device failures that may lead to data loss ($\tilde{r} = m - l + 1$)
 - e : Exposure Level: maximum number of symbols that any codeword has lost
 - T_i : Cycles (Fully Operational Periods / Repair Periods)
 - P_{DL} : Probability of data loss during repair period
 - Q : Amount of data lost upon a first-device failure
 - U : Amount of user data stored in a system comprised of n devices
 - $1/\lambda$: Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) of a device


$$\text{MTTDL} = \sum_{i=1}^m E(T_i) = \frac{E(T)}{P_{DL}} \approx \frac{1}{n \lambda P_{DL}} \quad \text{EAFDL} \approx \frac{n \lambda E(Q)}{U}$$

- System evolution does not depend only on the latest state, but on the entire path
 - underlying models are not semi-Markov


MTTDL and EAFDL expressions obtained using non-Markov analysis

Redundancy Placement

Erasure code with codeword length 3




Clustered Placement




Declustered Placement

Device Failure and Rebuild Process




Clustered Placement



Declassed Placement

System Model




Parameters

- n : number of storage devices
- k : number of devices in a group
- c : amount of data stored on each device
- C : number of codeword symbols stored in a device
- b : average reserved rebuild bandwidth per device


- $1/\lambda$: Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) of a device
 - General non-exponential failure distributions
- $1/\mu$: Time to read (or write) an amount of c data at a rate b from (or to) a device
 - $1/\mu = c / b$
- Highly reliable devices: $\lambda / \mu \ll 1$

Device Failure and Rebuild Process



- No unrecoverable (latent) errors encountered during rebuild
 - Successful rebuild

Unrecoverable Failure during Rebuild Process



Theoretical Results

- n : number of storage devices
- k : group size (number of devices in a group)
- c : amount of data stored on each device
- (m, l) : MDS erasure code
- b : reserved rebuild bandwidth per device
- B_{\max} : Maximum network rebuild bandwidth per group of devices
- $1/\lambda$: mean time to failure of a storage device
- P_s : probability of an unrecoverable sector (symbol) error

$$\text{MTTDL} \approx \frac{1}{n \lambda P_{\text{DL}}} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{EAFDL} \approx \frac{m \lambda E(Q)}{l c} \quad \text{where}$$

$$P_{\text{DL}} \approx P_{\text{DF}} + \sum_{u=1}^{\tilde{r}-1} P_{\text{UF}_u}$$

$$P_{\text{UF}_u} \approx -(\lambda c)^{u-1} \frac{E(X^{u-1})}{[E(X)]^{u-1}} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{u-1} \frac{\tilde{n}_i}{b_i} V_i^{u-1-i} \right) \log(\hat{q}_u)^{-(u-1)} \left(\hat{q}_u - \sum_{i=0}^{u-1} \frac{\log(\hat{q}_u)^i}{i!} \right)$$

$$P_{\text{DF}} \approx (\lambda c)^{\tilde{r}-1} \frac{1}{(\tilde{r}-1)!} \frac{E(X^{\tilde{r}-1})}{[E(X)]^{\tilde{r}-1}} \prod_{i=1}^{\tilde{r}-1} \frac{\tilde{n}_i}{b_i} V_i^{\tilde{r}-1-i}$$

$$E(Q) \approx E(Q_{\text{DF}}) + \sum_{u=1}^{\tilde{r}-1} E(Q_{\text{UF}_u})$$

$$E(Q_{\text{UF}_u}) \approx c \frac{l \tilde{r}}{m} (\lambda c)^{u-1} \frac{1}{u!} \frac{E(X^{u-1})}{[E(X)]^{u-1}} \left(\prod_{i=1}^{u-1} \frac{\tilde{n}_i}{b_i} V_i^{u-i} \right) \binom{m-u}{\tilde{r}-u} P_s^{\tilde{r}-u}$$

$$E(Q_{\text{DF}}) \approx c \frac{l}{m} (\lambda c)^{\tilde{r}-1} \frac{1}{(\tilde{r}-1)!} \frac{E(X^{\tilde{r}-1})}{[E(X)]^{\tilde{r}-1}} \prod_{i=1}^{\tilde{r}-1} \frac{\tilde{n}_i}{b_i} V_i^{\tilde{r}-i}$$







Numerical Results

- n = 64 : number of storage devices
- c = 12 TB : amount of data stored on each device
- s = 512 B : sector size
- $1/\lambda$ = 300,000 h : MTTF
- b = 50 MB/s : reserved rebuild bandwidth
- $1/\mu = cb$ = 66.7 h : MTTR
- $\lambda\mu$ = 0.0002 \ll 1 : MTTR to MTTF ratio
- m = 16 : number of symbols per codeword
- P_s : $P(\text{unrecoverable sector error})$

- Numerical results for two system configurations







- Declustered placement
 - $k = n = 64$
- Clustered placement
 - $k = 16$
 - System comprises 4 clustered groups

Effect of Latent Errors on MTDDL (declustered placement)

(a) $l = 13$ ($\tilde{r} = 4$)(b) $l = 14$ ($\tilde{r} = 3$)(c) $l = 15$ ($\tilde{r} = 2$)







- MTDDL significantly degraded by the presence of latent errors
- Field measurements show P_S to be in the interval $[4.096 \times 10^{-11}, 5 \times 10^{-9}]$

Effect of Latent Errors on MTDDL (clustered placement)

(a) $l = 13$ ($\tilde{r} = 4$)(b) $l = 14$ ($\tilde{r} = 3$), RAID-6(c) $l = 15$ ($\tilde{r} = 2$), RAID-5







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Effect of Latent Errors on EAFDL (declustered placement)

(a) $l = 13$ ($\tilde{r} = 4$)(b) $l = 14$ ($\tilde{r} = 3$)(c) $l = 15$ ($\tilde{r} = 2$)

- EAFDL affected at high sector error probabilities
- EAFDL unaffected by the presence of latent errors in the region of practical interest

Effect of Latent Errors on EAFDL (clustered placement)

(a) $l = 13$ ($\tilde{r} = 4$)(b) $l = 14$ ($\tilde{r} = 3$), RAID-6(c) $l = 15$ ($\tilde{r} = 2$), RAID-5

- EAFDL affected at high sector error probabilities
- EAFDL unaffected by the presence of latent errors in the region of practical interest

Summary

- Considered the reliability of erasure-coded storage systems in the presence of latent errors
- Assessed the MTTDL and EAFDL reliability metrics using a non-Markovian analysis
- Derived closed-form expressions for the MTTDL and EAFDL metrics
- Established that the declustered placement scheme offers superior reliability in terms of both metrics
- Demonstrated that for practical values of unrecoverable sector error probabilities
 - MTTDL is adversely affected by the presence of latent errors
 - EAFDL is practically unaffected by the presence of latent errors

Future Work

- The reliability evaluation of erasure-coded systems when device failures, as well as unrecoverable latent errors are correlated.