

A Model-Based Safe-by-Design Approach with IP Reuse for Automotive Applications

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Morayo Adedjouma, PhD

CEA Research Engineer, Safety expert, Project manager

- 2008/2012: System Safety Engineer in automotive domain
- 2012: PhD in Computer Science
- 2012/2015: Research associate & Fellow at University of Luxembourg (LU), McMaster University (CA)
- 2015/-: Member of Design of autonomous and embedded cyber physical systems lab at CEA LIST since 2015

Research interests:

- Model-driven engineering, process and system engineering
- Dependability/safety, assurance and certification of cyber physical systems
- Natural Language Processing and text semantic analysis, machine learning

Current projects: Trustworthy AI, dynamic risk management, Evolutionary certification for critical systems





- Model-based and reuse paradigms
- Our approach
 - Co-engineering system and safety
 - Reuse
 - Modelling framework
- Tool support
- Evaluation
- Conclusions: findings, limitations, perspectives



MODEL-BASED AND REUSE PARADIGMS

Reuse and Model-based as promising paradigms for system development promise

Reuse paradigm

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- Integrate in several engineering domains with code, software & hardware component libraries, CASE tools, etc.
- Support by standards through architecture modularity (SeOOC, IMA),

• Model-based paradigm

- Propose flexible and expressive semantics for easy and common understanding
- Also use in several engineering domains an align with standards recommendations

Both show benefits to save development effort and costs and to increase the quality of system/software



MODEL-BASED AND REUSE PARADIGMS

- Paradigms suffer of limits for large scale critical system
 - No so many open data approaches existing to achieve interoperability and reuse of data
 - No strong integration between model-based system engineering and RAMS analysis
 - No trivial to support reuse of safety assets due to their context-dependent nature
 - Tool support for both approaches are not well integrated



List MODEL-BASED SAFE-BY-DESIGN WITH IP REUSE METHOD


- Methodology
 - 1. Develop a co-engineering methodology to conduct safety assessment and system development process
 - Synchronize the processes through the requirements and output workproducts of activities
 - Combine top-down approach of system design with Bottom-Up approach of system implementation by storing and reusing safety artefacts and component IP cores
 - 3. Use a unified modeling environment to ease traceability and reuse management
- We develop the methodology over the ISO26262 reference development model, requirements and recommendations for compliance




SYSTEM & SAFETY CO-ENGINEERING

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SYSTEM AND SAFETY CO-ENGINEERING



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Flexible analysis


- Keep a desired level of precision during safety assessment (SA) process
- Control a complexity of RAMS methods applied
- Reduce time and cost required for SA
- Keep coherence of dysfunctional behavior on different levels
- Ensure unrivalled level of consistency, and traceability of dependability information




IP CORE AND SAFETY ARTEFCATS REUSE

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
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







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Requirement





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
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Compliance support



MBSA tool suite aligned with upcoming OMG Safety and Reliability standard






Evaluation procedure and data collection in 2 phase on an Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC)

- First phase: Develop an ACC focusing on compliance with Part 3 (Concept level), Part 4 (System level) and Part 5 (HW level) of ISO 26262
 - We do system description including requirements, functional and system architecture;
 - We perform required safety assessment using HARA, FMEA, FTA tool from Sophia
 - We store in repositories IP cores and safety artefacts
- Second Phase: Considering some changes in the requirements of the ACC to lower the criticality
 - We apply our methodology after an impact analysis
 - We review selected activities to review focusing on Part 4 (System level) still using Sophia tool suite
 - We reuse some assets collected from the first phase



USED CO-ENGINEERING AND REUSE METHOD







- MDE approach facilitates integration of RAMS techniques into the engineering process
 - Own RAMS dedicated models BUT consistent & aligned with system architecture models
- Uniform modeling environment avoid open data and interoperability issues
 - Smooth traceability across lifecycle
 - Build a system optimized for time, performance, cost
- Usage of reusable assets to lower system development effort & cost, and improve system quality
 - Reuse of design artefacts and safety artefacts
 - Reduce design defects by reusing already validated components/architectures

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- Co-engineering method system and safety development
 - Align with standards recommendations
 - Ease compliance evidence collection for compliance/qualification

LIMITATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

Limitations

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- Building reusable repositories takes time
 - Expect correct populated libraries several iterations on several projects
 - saving cost, time is not immediate
- Expertise is not embedded in the tool nor in the methodology but needed for a coherent and correct reuse strategy
 - What artefacts to save for reuse? What justification and information should be attached to a reusable assets
- Need a method to measure the level of reusability and to estimate the impact of dependability properties on reusable artefacts

Perspectives

- Integration with FIDES reliability prediction database to consolidate/extend the reusable assets repositories with standardized safe component (IP core)
- Adoption of contract-based approach to enforce reuse correctness





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