Secure Routing

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Course overview

- Internet Standards
  - Standards Development Organizations

- Routing
  - Motivation
  - Architecture
  - Different approaches

- Security
  - Motivation, Responsibility, Threats
  - Validation: Content and Transport Path
  - Examples
Network Device Configuration
  - Approaches
  - Layers

Routing and Security: KARP
  - Goals
  - Threats and Designs
  - Proposals

The future
  - More layers
Communications Standards Development Organizations

- Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
  - Hardware Standards
- Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  - Internet Standards (Request for Comments)
- International Telecommunications Union – Telecommunications (ITU-T)
  - Telephony Standards (Recommendations)

- A strong liaison exists among these bodies
The IETF does *not* standardize transmission hardware (we leave that to organizations such as the IEEE and the ITU) and does not standardize specialized application layer protocols. For example, we leave HTML and XML standards to the World-Wide Web Consortium. But the IETF *does* standardize all the protocol layers in between, from IP itself up to general applications such as email and HTTP.
IETF Structure

- Eight Areas
  - Applications (app)
  - General (gen)
  - Internet (int)
  - Operations and Management (ops)
  - Real-time Applications and Infrastructure (rai)
  - Routing (rtg)
  - Security (sec)
  - Transport (tsv)
Each area has 2 “Area Directors” (ADs), except
- Routing (3)
- General (1)
- Applications (1)

The IESG membership consists of all the ADs
- Responsible for the overall management of the IETF
Routing Area

- 23 Working Groups
  - idr (Inter-Domain Routing)
  - ospf (Open Shortest Path First IGP)
  - pim (Protocol Independent Multicast)
  - sidr (Secure Inter-Domain Routing)
  - ...

- Three Area Directors
Security Area

- 14 Working Groups
  - httpauth (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Authentication)
  - ipsecme (IP Security Maintenance and Extensions)
  - tls (Transport Layer Security)
  - ...

- Two Area Directors
Internet Architecture Board

- Provides architectural oversight
  - Series of reports on topics of concern to the entire Internet community
- Acts as an appeals board
An idea starts as an “Internet Draft” (ID)
- draft-atwood-pim-sm-linklocal

It is “adopted” by a Working Group
- draft-ietf-pim-sm-linklocal

After discussion, it undergoes “Working Group Last Call” (WGLC)

If it passes WGLC, it is subject to “IETF Last Call”, and review by the IESG (i.e., by all ADs)

If it passes scrutiny, it becomes an RFC
- RFC 5796
Routing

- Moving a packet from a source to a destination by the least-cost route
- Different definitions of “least cost”
  - Minimum number of hops
  - Factors of policy and charging
Routing Structures

S1 — R1 — R2 — D2

R3 — R4
Routing Structures

Shortest path: S1 – R1 – R2 – D2
Routing Structures

Shortest path avoiding R2: S1 – R1 – R3 – R4 – D2
At each router, need to determine where to send an incoming packet
  - Forwarding Information Base (aka Forwarding Table)
    - Local environment: few entries
    - Global Internet: 350,000 entries
    - Very hard to look up quickly

The task of a routing protocol is to fill the FIB with the appropriate entries
  - Obtain information from “peers”
  - Apply policies to get the “best” next router
Autonomous Systems

- Global Internet is large
  - Need for “local control” of parts of it
  - An Autonomous System is a part of the Internet with a “common routing policy”
  - Routing is at two levels:
    - Inter-AS
    - Intra-AS
  - Intra-AS routing tends to be “shortest path”
  - Inter-AS routing is policy-based
Different approaches to routing

- **Intra-AS routing**
  - Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs)
    - OSPF, IS-IS
  - All under one “administration” (more or less)
  - Shortest-path routing

- **Inter-AS routing**
  - Exterior Gateway Protocols (EGPs)
    - BGP
  - Many policy or contractual issues
  - Preferred routing tends to be defined by lawyers, not network personnel
Example routing protocols

- Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
  - E-BGP
  - I-BGP
- Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)
- Routing Information Protocol (RIP)
- Static routing
- Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM)
Border Gateway Protocol

- BGP provides inter-AS routing
- Routing packets are carried by TCP, since the “neighbors” can be quite far away
- BGP is specified by IDR WG
- Validity of BGP information is specified by SIDR WG
Open Shortest Path First

- Routing packets are (normally) link-local (i.e., not forwarded beyond the local subnet)
- They are carried directly by IP
- They are multicast to the neighbors
- OSPF is specified by the OSPF WG
A very early routing protocol
- Limited in scope, so RIP is used only in “small” routing domains.
  - Limit on the “diameter” of the routing graph
- Simpler than OSPF
Static Routing

- The Forwarding Table entries on a device are specified manually.
- Typically, static routing is used for end hosts.
  - An entry for “other hosts on the same network segment”
  - An entry for “the rest of the world” (i.e., a default gateway)
- Can be useful for large, structured networks, where little or no change is expected over time
Protocol Independent Multicast

- PIM is “independent” of the underlying unicast routing protocol, although it assumes the existence of a unicast Routing Information Base (RIB)

- Various “flavors”:
  - PIM-SM (Sparse mode)
  - PIM-SSM (Source-specific mode)
  - PIM-DM (Dense mode)
  - BIDIR-PIM (Bidirectional)
PIM...2

- The routing packets are normally link-local
- They are carried directly by IP
- They are multicast
- Some special PIM packets are sent unicast
Justification

- IAB Workshop on “Unwanted Internet Traffic”
  - Section 8.1 “A simple risk analysis would suggest that an ideal attack target of minimal cost but maximal disruption is the core routing infrastructure.”
  - Section 8.2 calls for “[t]ightening the security of the core routing infrastructure”.
- We will explore why this is not happening
Main steps

- Increase the security mechanisms and practices for operating routers
- Clean up the Internet Routing Registry [IRR] repository, and securing both the database and the access, so that it can be used for routing verifications
- Create specifications for cryptographic validation of routing message content
- Secure the routing protocols’ packets on the wire
Responsible parties

- OPSEC
  - *Operational Security Working Group*
  - Liaison with those running the IRRs globally

- SIDR
  - *Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group*

- KARP
  - *Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols Working Group*
Security is not just technical

- OPSEC
  - Operational (non-cryptographic) security considerations
- Liaison
  - Convincing others to act in concert
- SIDR
  - Validating the content of the messages
- KARP
  - Validating the exchanges themselves ("on the wire")
Generic Security Threats: RFC 4593

- Generic Routing Protocol Threat Model
  - Threat sources
  - Threat consequences
- Generally Identifiable Routing Threat Actions
  - Deliberate exposure
  - Sniffing
  - Traffic analysis
  - Spoofing
  - Falsification
Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection: RFC 6039

- Weaknesses of MD5 and SHA-1 are discussed
- Technical and management issues are identified

Protocols reviewed

- Open Shortest Path First Version 2 (IPv4)
- Open Shortest Path First Version 3 (IPv6)
- Intermediate System to Intermediate System Routing Protocol
- Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)
- Routing Information Protocol (RIP)
- Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
Validating the Contents: SIDR

- BGP is specified by IDR WG
- BGPsec is specified by SIDR WG
- Goal is to permit validation of the contents of the exchanges
- BGP uses TCP-MD5 or TCP-AO to ensure that the exchanges are authentic and have not been altered
BGPsec

- An extension to BGP that provides improved security for BGP routing

Motivation

- BGP does not include mechanisms that allow an AS to verify the legitimacy and authenticity of BGP route advertisements
- Vulnerability analysis RFC 4272
- Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) provides a first step
RPKI

- **Resources**
  - AS number
  - IP address

- RPKI certificates issued to holders of resources provide a binding
  - AS number <-> IP address

- and a cryptographic key to verify a digital signature
Route Origination Authorization

- ROA allows holders of IP address resources to authorize specific ASes to originate routes (in BGP) to these resources.
- Data extracted from valid ROAs can be used by BGP speakers to determine whether a received route was actually originated by an AS that is authorized to originate that route.
- RFC 6483
- RFC 7115
Local Policy

- Prefer a route that can be validated using RPKI data
- Can protect from certain mis-origination attacks
- Little or no protection from a sophisticated attacker
  - Append authorized origin AS to an illegitimate AS path
- draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats
BGPsec extension

- Add BGPsec router certificate
- Binds an AS number to a public signature verification key
- Private key is held by (one or more) BGP speakers within the AS
- BGP speaker signs on behalf of its AS
- Relying party can then verify that a given BGP signature was produced by a BGP speaker belonging to a given AS
Goal

- Use signature to protect the AS path data in BGP update messages
- So that a BGP speaker can assess the validity of the AS path data in the update message that it receives
Core of BGPsec is a new optional (non-transitive) attribute called BGPsec_Path

- AS path data
- Sequence of digital signatures, one for each AS in the path
- draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol
- New signature is added each time an update message leaves an AS
- Any tampering with AS path data or NLRI in the BGPsec_Path can be detected
Negotiation of BGPsec

- Separate for address family
- Separate for each direction
Update signing and validation

- Outline in draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview
- Specific details in draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol
Validating the Exchanges

- Security is specified in each Protocol Specification
- These specifications cover
  - Authenticity of sender
  - Integrity of the packet
Current practice

- No security
  - Never activate the security features of the routing protocol
- -OR-
- Install and forget
  - Put a shared key in place
  - Leave it unchanged for 5 years or more, until the router is replaced
Why?

- Operational Issues
  - Changing an active key requires coordinating both ends of the link

- Key rollover is a disaster
  - Usually results in breaking (and re-establishing) an adjacency
  - User data packets are lost during this process

- The (potential) loss of revenue from the lost packets is seen as more of a problem than the (potential) fallout from a security breach
On-the-wire Security Methods

- Security is achieved at various levels, depending on the Routing Protocol
- Typical Approaches
  - Authentication Trailer
  - IPsec
  - TCP-MD5, TCP-AO
Authentication Trailer

- A field, appended to the Routing Protocol packet, that permits authentication of the source of the packet.
- Based on calculating
  - A Message Digest (e.g., MD5) -or-
  - A Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
- over the RP packet and a (shared) key
- This provides authentication and integrity verification
IPsec

- IP Security (IPsec)
  - IPsec is a general purpose system, that provides security for all kinds of IP packets. It uses two headers (additions to the IP packet) called Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)
  - The AH is a field, part of the IP Header, that provides authentication of the source of the packet
  - The ESP is a field, part of the IP Header, that provides authentication of the source and confidentiality of the contents for a particular IP packet
  - Both ESP and AH ensure integrity
TCP-MD5 and TCP-AO

- TCP-MD5 is an extension to TCP that provides authentication of the source, using an MD5 hash
- TCP-AO is an extension to TCP that provides superior authentication compared with TCP-MD5.
- These are both achieved by adding to the TCP header
- Extended TCP is used by routing protocols that need security and the properties of TCP
Comparison

- Authentication Trailer
- IPsec
- TCP-AO (or TCP-MD5)
Examples

List of Protocols that use specific techniques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routing Protocol</th>
<th>Key Scope</th>
<th>Communication Type</th>
<th>Security Feature</th>
<th>Standard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BGP</td>
<td>Peer Keying</td>
<td>Unicast</td>
<td>OoB</td>
<td>TCP-AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIPv2</td>
<td>Group keying</td>
<td>Multicast</td>
<td>Built-in</td>
<td>AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSPFv2</td>
<td>Group keying</td>
<td>Both</td>
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<td>AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSPFv3</td>
<td>Group keying</td>
<td>Both</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AT: Authentication Trailer
OoB: Out of Band
Both: Unicast and Multicast
Router Configuration

- Manual
- Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- XML forms
  - See Nitin’s thesis
- NETCONF and YANG
Manual configuration

- Walk up to the router
  - Use a “console” (Terminal, DEC VT220)
- Access a router remotely
  - Use ssh to access a “virtual console” on the router
  - Depends on unicast routing already working, so this is only useful for “changes”.
Simple Network Management Protocol

- Provides the ability to read the state of a network device, and to set a new state.
- Originally had no security
- Acquired some security features over time, but they were very primitive
NETCONF

- IETF Standard for Network Configuration
- Basic set of operations for configuration
  - Install
  - Manipulate
  - Delete
- Client-Server Architecture: Remote Procedure Call
  - get, get-config, edit-config, copy-config, delete-config
  - Uses XML encoding
Multiple Logical Datastores
- writable-running, startup, candidate
- Each represents a possible configuration state
- Each can be configured independently, locked and unlocked, to ensure safe manipulation and consistency of the configuration data

No specific data-modeling language
- Private solutions
- XACML
Extensible Access Control Markup Language

- Expression of authorization policies in XML against objects that are themselves defined in XML.
  - Core schema
  - Corresponding namespace

- Extensible
  - Can define IP address, port number, device identity, etc. when required.

- Based on XML
  - Easy to extend, hard to reach consensus on extensions
Data Modeling Language

- XML
  - Not really suitable

- YANG
  - Hierarchical
  - Modular
  - Designed for NETCONF
  - Modules are reusable, extensible, and importable
  - Derived types
  - Can be translated into an equivalent XML
  - Supports versioning
Layers of Configuration Management

- **Routing Protocol (RP)** (Layer 1)
  - Manual Key and SA management assuming authentication.
  - RP specific security protocols and secret keys. It provides for message integrity protection and authorization.

- **Keys and Security Protocol** (Layer 2)
- **Key and SA Management** (Layer 3)
- **Configuration Management** (Layer 4)
  - No work on this aspect of key and SA management.
Routing and Security

- Routing Protocol documents tend to have poor or outdated “Security Considerations”
- All IETF documents have to be reviewed by the Security Directorate (part of the Security Area)
- Problem: How to ensure progress on the security side, without “scaring” the Routing Area personnel
- Joint agreement between the Security ADs and the Routing ADs
Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols

- Charter Goals
  - The KARP working group is tasked to work with the routing protocol working groups in order to improve the communication security of the packets on the wire used by the routing protocols. This working group is concerned with message authentication, packet integrity, and denial of service (DoS) protection. At present, this charter explicitly excludes confidentiality and non-repudiation concerns.
Determine current threats to the routing protocol operation, and define general requirements for cryptographic authentication of routing protocols. A primary source for this document should be draft-lebovitz-karp-roadmap, although RFC 4393 may also be useful.

Identify deficiencies of each routing protocol in scope, and specify mechanisms that bring them in line with the general requirements. These are referred to as protocol gap analysis documents.

Define one or more frameworks describing the common elements for modern authentication in routing protocols.
KARP..3

- Publish guidance on how to create a gap analysis for routing protocols.
- Publish guidance on guidance to operators on how to create and use integrity keys used with routing protocol message authentication.
- Specify automated key management needs for routing protocols.
KARP Documents

- Overview, Threats, and Requirements
  - Summary
- Design Guide
  - Summary
- Gap Analyses
  - Analyses of specific routing protocols
- Proposals for Automated Key Management
  - Case 1: unicast exchanges
  - Case 2: multicast exchanges
Overview

- KARP scope
- Incremental approach
- Goals
- Non-goals
- Audience
Overview, Threats, and Requirements: RFC 6862

- Threats
  - Review of specific threats to routing protocols
  - Threat sources
  - Threat actions in scope
  - Threat actions out of scope

- Requirements
  - For work phase 1
  - Update to a routing protocol’s existing transport security
Design Guide: RFC 6518

- Categorizing routing protocols
- Consider the future existence of a Key Management Protocol
- Roadmap
- Routing protocols in categories
- Supporting incremental deployment
- Denial-of-service attacks
- Gap analysis
- Security Considerations
Work phase 1: Routing Protocol Analyses

- RFC 6863
  - Open Shortest Path First
- RFC 6952
  - Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
  - Label Distribution Protocol (LDP)
  - Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
  - Multicast Source Distribution Protocol (MSDP)
- RFC 7492
  - Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
Work phase 2: Automated Key Management Protocols

- RKMP
  - draft-mahesh-karp-rkmp
- MaRK
  - draft-hartman-karp-mrkmp
- G-IKEv2
  - draft-yeung-g-ikev2
- Using G-IKEv2 for Routing Protocols
  - draft-tran-karp-mrmp
Layers of Configuration Management - Revisited

1. Manual Key management assuming authentication
2. Developing KMP for RP (KARP)

Security protocols and secret-keys are configured manually. The use of KMPs will automate this process.

Support module for KMP and provides a common baseline for management of security protocols and keys.

- Routing Protocol (RP) (Layer 1)
- Keys and Security Protocols (Layer 2)
- Key Management
- RPsec (Layer 3)
- Configuration Management (Layer 4)

Remote configuration and distribution
Layers of Configuration Management

Routing Protocol
- Data [SIDR]
- Packets on the Wire [KARP]
  (Layer 1)

Existing Security Mechanisms
  (Layer 2)

Key Management (KMP and manual method)
- KMP & Peer Validation
- SA Negotiation
- Keys and SAs

RPsec
- RPAD
- RSPD
- CKT

Configuration Management (NetConf)
  (Layer 4)

YANG modules for representation and configuration of RPsec databases

KMP negotiates SA and provides fresh keys to security protocols at layer 2

RPsec component databases
Getting the Senior Manager to Understand

- YANG provides a way to model the RPsec databases
- NETCONF provides a way to coherently distribute the configurations (YANG instances) to a set of devices
- Various senior managers have different views of what is important
- How to map from “corporate policies” to individual YANG configurations?
Getting Security Deployed

- Configuration of security is only one aspect of configuration of the overall device
- Any “new” approaches have to fit with existing deployments, and “play nice”
- There has to be a perceived advantage to adding the security, and little or no impact on the existing infrastructure
Thank you!

- Questions?