

**Corporate Technology** 

# **Rollout of Security Credentials** in Industrial Environments

**SECURWARE 2010** 

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#### **Motivation**

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#### **Industrial Environments: Process Automation**



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#### **Industrial Environments: Factory Automation**



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#### **Industrial Environments: Building Automation**



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#### **Industrial Environments: Energy Automation**



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#### IT-Security Becomes a Pre-requisite for Future Control Systems Driven by Convergence of Safety & Security

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#### **Security and Safety**

#### Security / IT Security:

Prevention of consequences of threats to a system (intentionally) caused by humans and/or environment



#### Safety:

Prevention of threats to humans and environment caused by technical systems



#### Interrelation Between IT-Security and Dependability of a System

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**Dependability** 

#### **IT-Security**



Security Incident: may threaten

**Remark:** Failures caused by security attacks cannot be assumed to be independent ! Therefore classical safety/failure analyses do not cover them properly

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### Example: Maroochy Waste Water Incident





#### Queensland, Australia, 2000:

Former contractor took control of 150 sewage pumping stations. Over a 3-month period, he released one million liters of untreated sewage.

Unauthorized access to the control system over a unsecured communication path.

Communications sent by radio links to wastewater pumping stations were being lost Pumps were not working properly Alarms put in place to alert staff to faults were not going off

**Remark:** Failures caused by security attacks cannot be assumed to be independent ! ⇒ Therefore classical safety/failure analyses do not cover them properly

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## Example: Potential Derogation of Dependability through Security



- The usage of standard anti-virus software may lead to blocking of safety relevant communication
- Standard anti-virus software typically requires human interaction
- Usage of IT-security mechanisms may occupy too many system resources

Standard IT-security mechanisms known from the office world have to be adapted to meet dependability requirements

## Example: Usage of "Plagiarisms" Influences System **SIEMENS** Behavior



## China, 2008:

System performance of mobile networks were decreased noticeably. The service company instructed for maintenance used cheaper plagiarisms instead of original spare parts.

IT-security measures (e.g. not forgeable "genuineness chip") can help to identify and thereby reduce the usage of plagiarisms.



#### **Differences and Security Applications**

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#### Automation Network Specifics: Focus on Different Security Requirements

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"Office" Security Concepts are not directly applicable for Automation Networks

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Embedded Security Mechanisms Provide Essential Functionality for Ensuring System Integrity SIEMENS

Security is required to ensure Safety-relevant system properties in environments exposed to attacks





#### **Credential Lifecycle**

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### Security Credential Have to be Managed Along Their Whole Lifecycle

#### Internal Generation (e.g., CSR) External Generation Session keys destructed after Long term keys, session keys session ending Typically done for asymmetric keys • Long term keys are deleted, after through a certificate authority (CA) keys have been renewed. • May be part of the key generation, Lifetime may end regularly or if the Generation depending on the credential key has been compromised. Certification **Destruction** Typically long term Depends on generation Archiving (secure or private) keys Distribution method are archived to enable • offline/online (in-band, access to encrypted data out-of-band) Update Storage

• Cryptographic keys have a dedicated lifetime

- may be performed by the security protocol
- based on a given security policy

- obfuscated in firmware, software
- in secured memory (e.g., flash)
- separate hardware module (e.g., smart card or a trusted platform module)

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# Security Credential Lifecycle Management – a Service Accompanying Products

#### Generation Product Definition of necessary security features in base Certification Design architecture Bootstrapping **Development and** Manufacturing of Generation of vendor specific security parameter **Products, Security** Manufacturing supporting the product individualization. **Service Definition** Distribution Projection of use case and/or customer specific Projection security parameter **Storage** Deployment in customer infrastructure comprises Installation key generation, certification, distribution and stor-Deployment age. Base can be the vendor specific credentials. Work **Development and Deployment of** Update Secure Plug & **Security Services** Security parameter maintenance: key update, **Operation** revocation and/or key archival Secure deletion of security parameter: comprises Decommiskey archiving, key destruction Archiving sioning Destruction

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#### **Potential Approaches**

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## Different Approaches can be Followed for Security Parameter Rollout

#### **Offline parameter distribution**

- Performed using dedicated engineering tools directly connected to the device or via a separate network
- Requires a (mobile or fixed) engineering station in the offline network having all parameter sets for the devices to be bootstrapped available.

#### **Out-of-band parameter distribution**

- Separate logical or physical communication channel used to configure security parameter. Basically resembles the offline distribution approach using an online connection instead of the separate physical network.
- Devices may already possess a cryptographic credential, which can be provided by the device manufacturer.

#### In-band parameter distribution

- Distribution using the same communication channels as used during regular operation
- May be based on pre-configured device identifier (like the MAC address), manufacturer installed security credentials or even liaison devices.

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# Credential Bootstrapping has to be Suitable for Addressed Environment

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#### Outlook

#### **Research Topics – Security and Device Authentication**



Industrial systems for all verticals like energy, transportation, automation systems, health require secure device authentication and machine-2-machine communication as a core security feature. Siemens is a leading provider for technology and solutions in these areas.

#### Situation

- Machine-2-Machine connectivity down to field devices is a major driver for Future Internet. Potentially more than 60 Billion devices will be connected. All industries are affected including manufacturing, process, building, energy automation, transportation, health.
- Device authentication is the prerequisite to ensure an appropriate protection of communication between different devices. This is the basis to realize secure device-oriented services like secure control, monitoring, remote service, metering, licensing or anti counterfeiting.
- Device credentials (keys, certificates) have to be generated and managed efficiently
- The non-human security environment requires new device-oriented security and identity infrastructures.
- The huge number of devices and the specific application environment require a zero-configuration effort.
- Process comprises the generation (short and long term), distribution and implementation of initial security parameter of the target devices

#### Topics

- Efficient cryptographic mechanisms for device authentication and secure device communication
- device security platform module
- device-oriented security and identity infrastructure (processes, scalability, limits of authority, privacy)
- Plug-and-play security to avoid administrative burden
- secure device-oriented services

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